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IS SYSTEMIC RISK PREVENTION THE NEW
PARADIGM? A PROPOSAL TO EXPAND
INVESTOR PROTECTION PRINCIPLES TO
THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY
CARY MARTIN†
INTRODUCTION
The tragic events that the financial crisis yielded will haunt
us for generations. In 2008, bank failures, government bailouts,
and widespread foreclosures infiltrated the daily lives of every
single American. The corresponding stock market losses and job
lay-offs were astounding. Many of us thought that our regulators
and market participants had long before absorbed the hardearned lessons from the Great Depression. However, it became
painfully clear that history may have repeated itself had the
government not aggressively intervened by putting a remarkably
expensive Band-Aid on the economy. As to be expected, the
government has been under severe political pressure to ensure
that comparable events never happen again. In response to this
pressure, Congress recently passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”)
which subjects numerous financial institutions to sweeping
regulation.1

†
J.D., Northwestern University School of Law (May 2006); William H. Hastie
Fellow and LLM Candidate, University of Wisconsin Law School (expected
completion, May 2012). I would like to extend special thanks to Professor Peter
Carstensen and Professor Darian Ibrahim from the University of Wisconsin Law
School for their invaluable comments. I would also like to thank Professor Lisa
Fairfax from George Washington University Law School, and Professor Dorothy
Brown from Emory University School of Law School for their tremendously helpful
feedback. Additionally, I would like to thank my co-fellow, Lahny Silva, for her
comments and endearing support throughout this process. Of course, all errors are
my own.
1
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S. Code).
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The Dodd-Frank Act is largely focused on monitoring the
extent to which these institutions contribute to systemic risk.2
There are multiple definitions of this term, but it generally refers
to “the risk of a broad-based breakdown in the financial system,
often realized as a series of correlated defaults among financial
institutions, typically banks, that occurs over a short period of
time and typically caused by a single major event.”3 As a result,
the Dodd-Frank Act likely targeted hedge funds because they can
potentially create a systemic risk event.4 More specifically, the
failure of a particular fund could result in catastrophic effects on
the entire economy because hedge funds have a symbiotic
relationship with investment banks.5
They rely on these
counterparties to employ significant amounts of leverage and
engage in various derivatives transactions.6 Thus, they can
expose these investment banks to excessive losses if a particular
trade goes against the expectations of a hedge fund adviser.7

2
Id. (The stated purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act are, “[t]o promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, [sic] to protect the American taxpayer by
ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and
for other purposes.”). See generally Roberta S. Karmel, The Controversy over
Systemic Risk Regulation, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 823 (2010) (providing an overview of
the Dodd-Frank Act’s focus on systemic risk).
3
Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008: Written
Testimony of Andrew W. Lo Prepared for the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, 110th Cong. 3–4 (2008) (written testimony of Andrew Lo, Harris & Harris
Group Professor, MIT Sloan School of Management) [hereinafter Written Testimony
of Andrew Lo], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1301217.
4
Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Hedge Fund Regulation
on the Horizon—Don’t Shoot the Messenger (June 18, 2009) [hereinafter
Commissioner Aguilar Speech], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2009/spch061809laa.htm. In this speech, Commissioner Aguilar states:
In their current form, hedge funds pose a systemic risk threat to our
financial system in several ways. First, hedge funds have such significant
assets under management that some fear that the loss of one or more large
firms could potentially reverberate throughout the capital markets. In
addition, if a counterparty fails to effectively withstand a hedge fund loss,
then the failure of the counterparty could itself threaten market stability.
Id.
5
Nicholas Chan et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds 1 (MIT Sloan Sch. of
Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4535-05, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 671443.
6
Commissioner Aguilar Speech, supra note 4.
7
Id.; see also Chan et al., supra note 5, at 2.
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Accordingly, Congress used the current political climate of
ensuring financial stability to pull hedge funds under the
umbrella of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
Since the Dodd-Frank Act8 is mostly focused on monitoring
systemic risk, the new legislation leaves many of the investor
protection issues created by the hedge fund industry unresolved.9
Many researchers in this area agree with this approach10 and
believe that investor protection is inapplicable since hedge funds
are restricted to sophisticated investors, which are institutions or
individuals who are required to maintain a certain financial networth.11 This view is consistent with traditional notions of
8

Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act is the section that regulates hedge funds. DoddFrank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 401–16, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570–79 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The formal name of Title IV is the
“Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010.” § 401, 124 Stat. at
1570 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 80b–20 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). However, I will simply
refer to the Dodd-Frank Act throughout this Article to avoid undue confusion.
9
See generally infra Part II (explaining why the Dodd-Frank Act is mostly
focused on systemic risk prevention).
10
The following articles on this topic focus on systemic risk prevention: Gregory
W. Brown et al., Are Hedge Funds Systemically Important? (Working Paper Series,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1689079;
Michael R. King & Philipp Maier, Hedge Funds and Financial Stability: Regulating
Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risks, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 283 (2009); Jeffrey
N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG.
151 (2011); Written Testimony of Andrew Lo, supra note 3; Anne Rivière, The Future
of Hedge Fund Regulation: A Comparative Approach: United States, United
Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263 (2011);
Monica Billio et al., Crises and Hedge Fund Risk (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 0714, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1130742.
11
The terms “sophisticated investor” and “accredited investor” will be used
interchangeably within this Article. The term “accredited investor” is defined in the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15)(2006) and 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2011).
The Dodd-Frank Act revised the accredited investor standard for natural persons so
that the individual net worth of any natural person, or joint net worth with the
spouse of that person, at the time of purchase, is more than $1,000,000 and excludes
the value of the primary residence of such natural person. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 413(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006 &
Supp. IV 2011)). The SEC must also periodically review this standard every four
years to take inflation into consideration. § 413(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1577 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 77b). Knowledge is not a prerequisite for becoming an accredited
investor. See § 413(a), 124 Stat. at 1577 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b). The other
federal securities law exemptions that hedge funds rely on include heightened
standards for determining the qualifications of sophisticated investors (for example,
the “qualified purchaser” standard in the Investment Company Act of 1940), but
these specific distinctions are not necessary for purposes of this Article.
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investor protection, which reject the argument that investor
protection principles should be expanded to hedge fund investors,
since they can presumably “fend for themselves.”12 In contrast,
this Article focuses on the need for greater protection of these
investors since the hedge fund industry has morphed into its own
distinct marketplace that has grown increasingly complex.
As such, this Article specifically argues that the Dodd-Frank
Act does not provide hedge fund investors with enough
information to adequately protect themselves from the unique
informational challenges associated with hedge fund
investments. These unique issues encompass an overall lack of
standardization within the industry, particularly with respect to
its disclosure practices, risk assessments and valuation
procedures. This lack of standardization, coupled with a limited
public disclosure regime, makes it exceptionally difficult for
investors to adequately investigate a particular hedge fund
investment. In addition, investors cannot effectively choose an
optimal hedge fund investment because these informational
challenges make it difficult to adequately compare a large range
of hedge fund opportunities. This severely limits investor choice
and competition within the industry.
These informational
challenges deserve heightened attention since the current
economic downturn resulted in the failure of approximately 1,500
hedge funds, which subsequently exposed such investors to
staggering losses.13 There are approximately 18,000 hedge funds

12
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). In this seminal case, the
Supreme Court held that an offering to those who can “fend for themselves” is not a
public offering and could therefore be exempt from federal securities regulation. Id.;
see also, e.g., Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L.
REV. 681, 713–14 (2000) (arguing that hedge fund protection through federal
legislation is unnecessary); Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision To Regulate Hedge
Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.
975, 990 (asserting that the government should not expand investors protection
principles to hedge fund investors).
13
David Reilly, Hedge Funds Get To Feel Like ‘Smart Guys’ Again: David
Reilly,
BLOOMBERG
(July
1,
2009,
12:01
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aMIX3xXmjVHE; see
also SWISS ANALYTICS, HEDGE FUND DUE DILIGENCE. . . MORE THAN JUST A
BACKGROUND
CHECK
1
(May
2009),
available
at
http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/hedge-fund-due-diligence/2009/
20090507/Due_Diligence_More_Than_Just_Background_Check.pdf (indicating that
approximately “2,000 hedge funds have closed . . . their doors since the onset of the
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that reported performance in 2009,14 but this seems to be the
only industry, with as many participants, which does not have an
organizational or regulatory structure broadly supporting it.15
Furthermore, the losses of hedge fund investors could
adversely impact other market participants, as well as the
overall securities markets. For example, many pension plans,
endowments, and insurance companies invest in hedge funds,
which could expose their underlying constituents to excessive
risks.16 The SEC also uses a significant amount of its resources
to monitor the hedge fund industry, even though sophisticated
investors are presumed to be sufficiently capable of protecting
themselves.17 These costs could be mitigated if sophisticated
investors were provided greater protections that would enable
them to make better investment choices.18 Moreover, the overall
stability of the entire economy can be adversely impacted by such
losses since our markets our inextricably connected.19 The
financial crisis provided a plethora of evidence on this point.20
For these reasons, expanding investor protection principles to
hedge fund investors is a pressing issue that will help to protect
the overall integrity of our security markets.
This Article presents an alternative regulatory approach
that seeks to create uniform and mandatory measures of
valuation and risk for these investment vehicles, which would
resolve many of these unique informational challenges.21 These
uniform valuation mechanisms would ensure that the fees and
returns reported by hedge funds are reliable and fair. In

financial crisis and that as many as 2,000 more may follow suit over the next 18
months”); Commissioner Aguilar Speech, supra note 4.
14
PERTRAC FIN. SOLUTIONS, PERTRAC’S 2009 HEDGE FUND DATABASE STUDY 3
(Mar.
2010),
http://www.pertrac.com/per0020/web/localdata/WEB/DATA/
WEBSECTIONS]MATTACHMENT/PER0020_1368//PerTrac%202009%20Hedge%20
Fund%20Database%20Study.pdf. It is difficult to track the total number of hedge
funds because there is no mandatory reporting framework that would require all
such funds to register.
15
RICHARD HORWITZ, HEDGE FUND RISK FUNDAMENTALS: SOLVING THE RISK
MANAGEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY CHALLENGE 143 (2004).
16
See infra Part IV.B.
17
See infra Part IV.A.
18
See infra Part IV.A.
19
See infra Part IV.C.
20
See infra Part IV.C.
21
See generally infra Part V.
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addition, these uniform risk measures would help such investors
effectively compare and aggregate risks across a number of hedge
funds. They would also be tabulated and made available to
interested sophisticated investors in a risk database. This risk
database would be constructed so that the proprietary holdings of
hedge funds are protected. This alternative framework would
therefore provide more reliable and consistent disclosures to
investors, while protecting the legitimate investing needs of
hedge funds. Moreover, mandating standardization across the
entire industry could decrease systemic risk because enhancing
investor choice and transparency inevitably leads to better
functioning markets.
Part I of this Article describes the basic hedge fund
structure, explains the benefits that hedge funds can provide to
the national securities markets and highlights the controversies
that are frequently associated with these investment vehicles.
Part II explains why the Dodd-Frank Act is mostly focused on
systemic risk prevention as opposed to investor protection, and
gives a broad overview of its relevant provisions. It also
demonstrates that the Dodd-Frank Act does little to increase
investor protection. For example, with respect to preventing
hedge fund fraud, the exemptions provided under the act will
limit the SEC’s ability to detect fraud within hedge funds where
fraud is most likely to occur. Part III identifies the unique
investor protection issues that arise from hedge fund
investments, such as the lack of standardized disclosure
practices, risk calculations, and valuation mechanisms, and Part
IV explains how the losses of sophisticated investors can impact
other market participants, as well as the entire economy. Part V
then proposes an alternative regulatory framework which would
eliminate certain exemptions and exclusions from the definition
of “private fund” under the Dodd-Frank Act and create a new
self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) that would: (1) establish
certain standardized business practices for private funds so that
hedge fund investors can adequately investigate and compare
potential hedge fund investments; and (2) develop a risk
database system that would resolve transparency issues and
promote competition within the hedge fund industry, while
protecting the legitimate investing needs of hedge funds.
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BACKGROUND ON HEDGE FUNDS

This Part is designed to give a general overview of hedge
funds. This section begins by describing the basic hedge fund
structure and continues by explaining the various benefits that
these investment vehicles can provide to its investors and to the
national securities markets.
It concludes with a detailed
explanation of the controversies associated with these vehicles
that eventually led to increased regulation under the DoddFrank Act.
A.

Hedge Fund Structure

The term “hedge fund” is shrouded with mystery and
obscurity, even though hedge funds account for over fifty percent
of the trading volume on the New York and London stock
exchanges.22 This intrigue is partially due to the fact that hedge
funds have never been officially defined by any regulatory body.23
It is difficult to create a single definition because the actual
investment strategies of hedge funds are extremely
heterogeneous.24 In their most basic form, hedge funds are
investment vehicles that are formed by investment advisers who
solicit money from a number of investors.25 In this regard, hedge
funds are comparable to mutual funds, but they differ with
respect to their registration status, legal structures, and
investment constraints.26 Hedge fund advisers are typically
experienced financial professionals who have developed a unique
investment strategy that “guarantees” positive returns
irrespective of market conditions.27 Hedge fund investors must
be “sophisticated,” which means that each must either possess a

22
Greg Ip & Henny Sender, Cash Machine: In Today’s Buyouts, Payday For
Firms Is Never Far Away, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2006, at A1.
23
See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (observing
that securities laws do not define hedge fund); Registration Under the Advisers Act
of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,055 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. 275 & 279) (“There is no statutory or regulatory definition of
hedge fund . . . .”).
24
FILIPPO STEFANINI, INVESTMENT STRATEGIES OF HEDGE FUNDS 2 (2006).
25
GERALD T. LINS ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS:
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE § 1.1 (2010).
26
Id.
27
See id. §§ 1.2, 2.2. Such returns are generally referred to as “absolute
returns.” Id. § 1.1.
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certain level of financial wealth or be a certain type of institution
in order to invest in such vehicles.28 Once the investment adviser
gathers enough money from sophisticated investors to form a
sizable pool of assets, the adviser then invests those assets into a
range of instruments to fulfill the promise of absolute returns.
The term “hedge” refers to the fact that they have historically
used various strategies in order to hedge, or protect, their
portfolios against market losses.29 For example, an investment
adviser could simultaneously take long and short positions in the
same type of instrument in order to ensure a return in both high
and low markets.30 This was essentially how Alfred Winslow
Jones structured the first hedge fund in 1949.31 He used short
sales and leverage to create returns that had a low correlation to
general market performance.32 Today, however, a multitude of
hedge fund strategies exist, some of which may or may not hedge
their investments.33
Despite their prevalence in our markets, hedge funds have
remained mostly unregulated prior to the passage of the DoddFrank Act.34 Since hedge fund investments are securities35 and

28
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (2006); 17 C.F.R § 230.501(a)
(2011).
29
See JOSEPH G. NICHOLAS, INVESTING IN HEDGE FUNDS 15 (2005).
30
See id. at 12–15.
31
STEFANINI, supra note 24.
32
Id.
33
See
What
is
a
Hedge
Fund?,
HENNESEE
GRP.
LLC,
http://www.hennesseegroup.com/hedgefund/index.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
34
The SEC recently attempted to bring hedge funds under its umbrella by
implementing the “Hedge Fund Rule” on December 10, 2004, which eliminated the
“private advisers exemption” under the Advisers Act. Registration Under the
Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,055 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. 275 & 279). This exemption was available to advisers who
had fewer than fifteen clients and a single client typically included an entire hedge
fund managed by an adviser as opposed to including each separate investor within
such fund. See id. The Hedge Fund Rule rejected this interpretation of the word
“client” by requiring advisers to count each individual investor within a fund, which
made the private advisers exemption unavailable for many hedge fund advisers. Id.
However, in Goldstein v. SEC, the court held that the Hedge Fund Rule was
arbitrary and it exceeded the SEC’s rulemaking authority because its interpretation
of the word “client” fell “outside the bounds of reasonableness” 451 F.3d 873, 881–83
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
35
See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). The term “security” is
defined under this section of the Securities Act. If an issuer offers securities as
defined in this section, then such issuer must register its offering under the
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pooled investment vehicles,36 they fall within the regulatory
framework of the four federal securities laws which are: (1) The
Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”);37 (2) The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”);38 (3) The Investment
Company Act of 1940 (“Company Act”);39 and (4) The Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”).40 However, most hedge
funds rely on numerous exemptions provided under these laws so
as to avoid the investment constraints and rigorous disclosure
requirements that would result from registration.41 In order to
comply with these exemptions, hedge funds are mostly restricted
to sophisticated investors.42 This exclusion is supported by the
notion that our government should not use its limited resources
to protect sophisticated investors since they can use their own
financial and institutional resources to gain comparable, if not
superior protection.43 As a result, hedge funds retain greater
flexibility in making investments as compared to mutual funds,
their registered counterparts.44 For example, hedge funds are not

Securities Act and file periodic disclosures under the Exchange Act, unless there is
an available exemption. See id. § 77f(a).
36
See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-3 (West 2011). The
term “investment company” is defined in this section. If an issuer is an investment
company as defined in this section, then such issues must comply with the terms
under the Company Act and register under the Advisers Act, unless there is an
available exemption. Id. at § 80a-8(a).
37
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a–77aa (West 2011).
38
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a–78pp (West 2011).
39
Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (West 2011).
40
Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-1 to -18c (West 2011).
41
See SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO
THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 11–33 (2003)
[hereinafter IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf
(providing
a
detailed
discussion on the exemptions that hedge funds frequently rely on).
42
See id. at ix–x.
43
See id. at 12–13.
44
The
Laws
that
Govern
the
Securities
Industry,
SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) (“The regulation is
designed to minimize conflicts of interest that arise in these complex operations. The
Act requires these companies to disclose their financial condition and investment
policies to investors when stock is initially sold and, subsequently, on a regular
basis. The focus of this Act is on disclosure to the investing public of information
about the fund and its investment objectives, as well as on investment company
structure and operations.”). See generally Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1 to -64
(West 2011) (the federal securities law that primarily regulates mutual funds).
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required to adhere to any diversification policies and they can
use their assets to retain large cash positions instead of
maintaining actual investments.45
B.

Benefits of Hedge Funds

Hedge funds often provide numerous benefits to the national
securities markets. They can help to maintain market efficiency,
facilitate capital formation, and provide liquidity to the national
securities markets.46 For example, many hedge funds seek
investment opportunities from undervalued securities, which can
help move the actual price of such securities closer to their true
values.47 In addition, hedge funds often make the securities
markets more liquid through their significant participation in the
buying and selling of securities.48
They are also willing
purchasers of several types of derivatives, which can help other
counterparties to reduce their own risks.49 Moreover, hedge
funds can provide investors with a unique risk management
opportunity to guarantee positive returns irrespective of market
conditions.50 Sophisticated investors have consistently taken
advantage of this opportunity, which is largely unavailable in
other investment company structures.51
C.

Controversies Related to Hedge Funds

1.

Leverage

Despite the proposed benefits of hedge funds, there are many
corresponding controversies that have often created a public
outcry for the increased regulation of these vehicles. One of the
most controversial characteristics of hedge funds is their ability

45

LINS ET AL., supra note 25, § 1.1.
Testimony Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of
Christopher Cox, Former Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter Christopher Cox Testimony],
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts072506cc.htm.
47
William A. Roach, Jr., Note, Hedge Fund Regulation: “What Side of the
Hedges Are You on?” 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 165, 173 (2009).
48
Id. at 174.
49
Christopher Cox Testimony, supra note 46.
50
Id.
51
See id.
46
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to employ unlimited amounts of leverage.52 Leverage refers to
“the use of various financial instruments or borrowed capital,
such as margin, to increase the potential return of an
investment.”53 A typical leverage transaction occurs when a
hedge fund adviser borrows a portion of the fund’s assets from a
prime broker or investment bank.54 The use of leverage gives
advisers the ability to increase returns of a particular fund,
without having to increase the actual amount of capital
invested.55 Conversely, the use of excessive leverage could cause
the losses of a fund to exceed the actual amounts invested, which
is the contributing factor to several recent hedge fund blow-ups.56
More importantly, the use of excessive leverage could create a
situation where a hedge fund failure leads to substantial losses
for the prime-brokers and investment banks since the fund will
not have enough equity to pay off its creditors.57
The most widely-publicized hedge fund debacle occurred
when Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”), a Connecticut
based hedge fund, suffered significant losses in August 1998
when Russia devalued the ruble.58 During this same time period,
LTCM also had a balance-sheet leverage ratio that exceeded 25
to 1.59 Thus, the primary trading counterparties, which included
multiple banks and creditors, were the firms that were most

52

See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS,
HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
11–12 (1999) [hereinafter LTCM REPORT], available at http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf (specifies that the amount of
leverage employed by a particular hedge fund is only limited to the extent requested
by its actual counterparties).
53
Leverage Definition, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/
leverage.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
54
LINS ET AL., supra note 25, § 2:3.
55
Leverage Definition, supra note 53.
56
See Houman B. Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation, 30
REGULATION 36, 40 (2007).
57
LTCM REPORT, supra note 52, at 13, 17.
58
Testimony Concerning Investor Protection Implications of Hedge Funds,
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong.
(2003) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Former Chairman, SEC), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/041003tswhd.htm.
59
LTCM REPORT, supra note 52, at 12.
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exposed to LTCM’s losses.60 This phenomenon was further
explained by Roger Lowenstein, a reputable financial journalist,
who stated that
If [LTCM] defaulted, all of the banks in the room would be left
holding one side of a contract for which the other side no longer
existed . . . . Undoubtedly, there would be a frenzy as every
bank rushed to escape its now one-sided obligations and tried to
sell its collateral from [LTCM].”61

2.

Derivatives

Hedge funds frequently rely on derivatives to ensure positive
returns irrespective of market conditions.62 However, they are
often considered to be riskier financial instruments than
securities.63 By way of background, a derivative is “a financial
instrument whose value derives from that of something else.”64
That “something else” could be a physical commodity, a security,
or even a price index, and these instruments are referred to as
the “underlier[s]” of derivatives contracts.65 Futures are a
common example of a derivatives contract where, “a party agrees
to either buy or sell an underlying commodity or security at a
specified price on a specified date in the future.”66 Other familiar
examples of derivatives instruments include forwards, swaps,
and options. Hedgers use futures contracts to protect against the
risk of price fluctuations within various markets, while
speculators use futures contracts to profit from inefficiencies
within those same markets.67 Essentially, speculators make a
prediction of what the price of a particular commodity or
instrument may be at some future date. They then use futures,
or other types of derivatives, to profit from the probability of
their prediction actually coming true.68 If their predictions are
60

Id. at 13.
ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONGTERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, at xix (2000).
62
MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT DERIVATIVES: THE EASY WAY TO GET STARTED
3–5 (2006).
63
See, e.g., id. at 5.
64
Id. at 3.
65
Id. at 1.
66
Id. at 25.
67
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 190 (11th ed. 2009).
68
DURBIN, supra note 62, at 5.
61
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accurate, then speculators earn substantial profits.69 Conversely,
if their predictions are wrong, then they suffer significant
losses.70
Additionally, derivatives transactions usually constitute a
“zero-sum game” where one party’s gains depend on the other
party’s equivalent losses.71
Thus, a party engaging in a
derivatives transaction can either earn handsome profits or lose
more than one hundred percent of their initial investment.
Conversely, an investment in a security either increases or
decreases in value, but rarely causes the investor to lose one
hundred percent of its initial investment.
Due to these
heightened risks of investing in derivatives instruments, they are
often associated with numerous hedge fund failures and other
systemic risk events.72 Warren Buffet’s firm reiterated this view
in its 2002 annual report which states that “derivatives are
financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that,
while now latent, are potentially lethal.”73 Several types of
complex derivatives transactions also caused the failure of
several notable financial institutions during the most recent
financial crisis.74
3.

Liquidity

Hedge fund investments are also significantly less liquid
than mutual fund investments. In this case, liquidity refers to
the ease through which an investor can redeem its total
investment from an investment vehicle. While mutual funds
usually permit redemptions on a daily basis, hedge funds often
require thirty to ninety day notice periods for investor

69

Id.
Id.
71
Zero-Sum
Game
Definition,
INVESTOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/z/zero-sumgame.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
72
See, e.g., BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 67, at 188.
73
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT (2003), available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf.
74
See generally The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Prof.
Michael
Greenberger,
Univ.
of
Md.
Sch.
of
Law),
available
at
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310175404/http://c0182412.cdn1.clou
dfiles.rackspacecloud.com/2010-0630-Greenberger.pdf.
70
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redemptions.75 Some hedge funds can even lock-up an investor’s
initial investment for one or more years.76 Thus, if a hedge fund
investor wishes to redeem their money from a particular fund,
they may be subject to lengthy lock-up periods that could expose
an investor to increased losses. These limited liquidity rights,
combined with the sometimes riskier investment activities of
hedge funds, could create undue risk for hedge fund investors.
4.

Fees

The fee structures employed by hedge fund advisers are also
unique because they typically receive a performance fee that is
based on the actual profits earned by a fund.77 Some critics argue
that receiving a performance fee could increase the likelihood of
advisers engaging in riskier investments to guarantee a profit,
especially since such advisers will not incur an equivalent loss in
personal earnings, if the overall fund incurs a loss.78 However,
some supporters argue that aligning the interests of the adviser
with its investors reduces many of the agency problems
associated with such arrangements, especially when the adviser
also invests a portion of its own money into the fund.79 These
fees are generally calculated as a percentage of a fund’s net asset
value.80 Furthermore, as will be discussed in Section III below,
there is no standardized mechanism for calculating hedge fund
valuations, which is the primary component of a fund’s net asset
value.81
Thus, unscrupulous hedge fund advisers could
fraudulently inflate a fund’s valuations to increase their
performance fees.82

75

Henry Ordower, The Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and State
Funds, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 311 (Supp. 2010).
76
NICHOLAS, supra note 29, at 44.
77
NICHOLAS, supra note 29, at 46. Hedge fund advisers also receive a fixed fee,
which is based on a percentage of a fund’s net asset value. Mutual fund advisers
also receive these fixed fees. Id.
78
Ordower, supra note 75, at 312.
79
Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial
Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 240, 276–79 (2009).
80
Ordower, supra note 75, at 312.
81
Id. at 311–12.
82
Id. at 312–13.
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II. SYSTEMIC RISK FOCUS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
Part I highlights some, but not all, of the controversies
associated with hedge fund investments. These issues can be
alleviated by laws that would decrease systemic risk, as well as
increase investor protection. While the Dodd-Frank Act attempts
to resolve some of these issues, its primary focus is limited to
preventing systemic risk.83 This leaves many of the investor
protection issues unresolved.84 As such, this Part begins by
explaining why the Dodd-Frank Act is primarily focused on
systemic risk prevention and continues by giving a general
overview of the Dodd-Frank Act’s relevant provisions. This
section concludes by explaining why the Dodd-Frank Act will
have a minimal impact on the protection of hedge fund investors.
A.

Reasons for Systemic Risk Focus

Systemic risk generally refers to “the risk of a broad-based
breakdown in the financial system, often realized as a series of
correlated defaults among financial institutions, typically banks,
that occurs over a short period of time and typically caused by a
single major event.”85 Systemic risk can be mitigated by laws
that impose minimum capital requirements, leverage limits, and
investment constraints on institutions whose failure would
warrant government intervention.
Much of the current
literature on this topic analyzes how the activities of hedge funds
can contribute to systemic risk.86 Since hedge funds have a
symbiotic relationship with banks, the losses of hedge funds
could adversely affect the holdings of banks, and thus increase
the likelihood of a systemic risk event.87 The near failure of
LTCM is an example of a systemic risk event caused by a single
hedge fund.88
Systemic risk has recently gained widespread attention since
the financial meltdown resulted in a number of bank failures and
government bailouts that shattered our economic stability. In
83
See infra Part II (explaining why the Dodd-Frank Act is mostly focused on
systemic risk prevention).
84
See infra Part IV (discussing the need for additional investor protection).
85
Written Testimony of Andrew Lo, supra note 3, at 3–4.
86
See supra text accompanying note 10.
87
Chan et al., supra note 5.
88
Id. at 20, 56.

WF_Martin (Do Not Delete)

102

12/17/2012 5:28 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:87

response to the financial crisis, Congress created the
Congressional Oversight Panel which is “empowered to hold
hearings, review official data, and write reports on actions taken
by Treasury and financial institutions and their effect on the
economy.”89 In January 2009, the Congressional Oversight Panel
issued a special report that analyzed the current state of the
regulatory system and made specific recommendations for
regulatory reform.90 Many of the recommendations within this
report focused on identifying and regulating financial institutions
that pose a systemic risk to the economy.91 In September 2009,
the SEC created the new Division of Risk, Strategy, and
Financial Innovation to investigate and analyze issues involving
systemic risk.92
Previously, the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury Department were the government entities that were
primarily responsible for addressing systemic risk, while the
SEC’s primary focus was investor protection.93
Since the
financial meltdown brought systemic risk to the forefront of the
political agenda, the Dodd-Frank Act mostly incorporates
provisions that could mitigate systemic risk.
B.

Overview of Dodd-Frank Act

1.

Registration Under the Advisers Act

The Dodd-Frank Act will require many hedge fund advisers
to register under the Advisers Act, which is the federal
legislation that regulates the advisers of pooled investment
The Advisers Act imposes certain disclosure
vehicles.94

89
CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY
REFORM: MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, AND
ENSURING STABILITY 51 (Jan. 2009), http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909report-regulatoryreform.pdf [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY
REFORM].
90
Id.
91
Id. at 22–23.
92
Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation Overview, SEC,
www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin.shtml (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
93
Paredes, supra note 12, at 990.
94
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). The Dodd-Frank Act has also created a
new regulatory framework for the OTC market. §§ 701–774, 124 Stat. at 1641–802
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, & 15 U.S.C.). This regime could
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requirements on registered advisers such as descriptions of the
advisory services offered, material conflicts of interest, any
pending disciplinary actions, advisory fees charged, and other
general business descriptions.95 It also subjects advisers to
additional fiduciary obligations and certain record-keeping
requirements.96
The SEC conducts random inspections of
registered advisers to ensure that they are in compliance with
the Advisers Act.97 According to the SEC, the Advisers Act, and
its corresponding regulations, are designed to protect investors,
even though the SEC will likely use the information gathered
from registered advisers to assess systemic risk.98
In effect, the Dodd-Frank Act eliminates the private-adviser
exemption that hedge fund advisers previously relied on in order
to avoid registration under the Advisers Act.99 Moreover, all
hedge funds that fall within the new definition of “private fund”
will have to register under the Advisers Act.100 A private fund is
defined as any issuer that would be an investment company, as
defined in the Company Act,101 but for sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of
that Act.102 Thus, if a hedge fund previously relied on the
exemptions set forth in sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Company
Act, then it must register under the Advisers Act.103 Under
section 3(c)(1) of the Company Act, if a hedge fund has less than
one hundred beneficial owners, then it is not required to register
under the Company Act.104 Under section 3(c)(7), if hedge funds

subject hedge funds that trade OTC derivatives to additional reporting requirements
and certain capitalization and leverage requirements as Swap Dealers (SDs) or
Major Swap Participants (MSPs). § 727–30, 124 Stat. at 1696–702. However, the
application of these standards to hedge fund advisers is unclear until the SEC issues
additional guidance on the actual definitions of SDs and MSPs. §§ 721(a)(33),
721(a)(49), 124 Stat. at 1658.
95
See Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-4 (c)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/
about/laws.shtml#invadvact1940 (last visited on Sept. 12, 2012).
99
See Dodd-Frank Act, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
100
Id.
101
Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
102
Dodd-Frank Act, § 402, 124 Stat. at 1570 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(29) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
103
See id.; § 403 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(1)).
104
Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-3(c)(1) (West 2011).
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limit their investments to “qualified purchasers,” then they are
also exempt from the registration requirements of the Company
Act.105 Presumably, Congress used this convoluted definition of
private fund to capture the large number of hedge funds that rely
on sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Company Act in order to
avoid the arduous requirements that normally apply to mutual
funds.
2.

Exemptions and Exclusions from Registration Under the
Advisers Act

Under the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress also adopted various
exemptions from registration under the Advisers Act for certain
private funds.106 As a result, the SEC and the investors of such
funds will not receive the standard disclosures that would be
mandated under the Advisers Act.107 Congress directs the SEC to
exempt advisers that only advise private funds and have assets
under management in the United States of less than
$150,000,000.108 In addition, managed futures funds109 and other
funds that hold a limited amount of securities are not “private
funds” under the Dodd-Frank Act, and thus are not required to
be registered.110 Family offices,111 venture capital funds,112 and
certain foreign advisers113 will also be exempt from registration.

105

§ 80a-3(c)(7)(A).
Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 407–410, 124 Stat. 1376, 1574–76 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(l)(1), -3(m)(1), -2(a)(11), -3(n) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
107
Dodd-Frank Act § 404, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(2)(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
108
Dodd-Frank Act, § 408, 124 Stat. 1376, 1575 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). However, these funds are still
required to maintain certain records and provide certain reports as the SEC deems
necessary or appropriate in the public interest. § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575 (codified as
amended at 15 US.C. § 80b-3(m)(2)).
109
LINS ET AL., supra note 25, at § 11.1 (defining “managed futures fund[s]” as
“funds [that] actively trade commodity futures and options on futures”).
110
§ 403, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)).
111
§ 409, 124 Stat. at 1575 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(G)).
112
§ 407, 124 Stat. at 1574 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(l)(1)).
113
§ 403, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3)).
106
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Collection of Systemic Risk Data

Under the Dodd Frank Act, all registered investment
advisers to private funds, including certain exempt advisers, may
be required to provide additional disclosures to the SEC beyond
the specific disclosures requirements set forth under the Advisers
Act.114 It seems that these disclosures are designed to help the
SEC identify whether certain hedge funds pose a systemic risk to
the economy.115 However, the SEC has not yet defined systemic
risk or identified ways in which systemic risk can be measured.
More specifically, every investment adviser may be required to
file with the SEC a description of its assets under management,
use of leverage, counterparty credit exposure, trading and
investment positions, valuation policies and practices, types of
assets
held,
and
“such
other
information
as
the
Commission . . . determines is necessary and appropriate in the
public interest and for the protection of investors or for the
assessment of systemic risk . . .”116 The SEC essentially has
broad discretion to collect any information it deems necessary in
order to protect the public interest. Yet, investors will not have
access to this information. The SEC is supposed to guarantee
that the information is kept in confidence and only disclosed to
Congress or to other regulators.117 However, in the Managed
Funds Association’s (“MFA”) response to this particular provision
of the Dodd-Frank Act, they stated that
[s]uch information is highly sensitive from a competitive
standpoint and advisers to private investment funds employ
substantial safeguards to protect the proprietary and
confidential information of the funds they manage, including
114

§ 404, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b)(3)).
Certain mid-sized funds, presumably including certain funds that would be exempt
pursuant to section 408 of the Act (exempts advisers who have less than $150
million under management), could be subject to these additional reporting
requirements if they pose a systemic risk to the economy. § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(1)).
115
See § 404, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b4(b)(1)(A)). Hedge funds that pose a systemic risk could also be identified as
“Designated Companies” by the new “Oversight Council” which would subject them
to additional reporting requirements and investment constraints. Id. An analysis of
this provision is irrelevant for purposes of this Article, which is confined to investor
protection issues.
116
§ 404 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b)(3)(H)).
117
§ 404 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § (b)(7)(B)).

WF_Martin (Do Not Delete)

106

12/17/2012 5:28 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:87

information related to their investment strategies, portfolio
holdings and investor base. It is also critical that sensitive
investor information that may be reported by an adviser be
protected by the SEC. Public disclosure of confidential investor
information could cause potential harm to those investors.118

Thus, the MFA, as well as many other market participants,
is concerned that the improper dissemination of this information
could actually harm hedge fund investors if a third party
replicates the strategy of a particular hedge fund.119
C.

Limited Impact on Investor Protection

The second category of the controversies associated with
hedge fund investments relate to investor protection, which is the
cornerstone of our federal securities laws. These laws generally
seek to protect investors by giving them the necessary tools to
make better investment decisions.120 More specifically, these
laws ensure investor protection by (1) deterring investment
advisers from participating in fraudulent investment activities;
(2) providing investors with more information and greater
transparency to make better investment decisions since private
actors may not have an incentive to disclose all pertinent
information especially in easily compared form; and/or
(3) providing regulators with more information and greater
efficiency to better detect investment fraud.121 Since hedge funds
are still restricted to sophisticated investors, the Dodd-Frank Act
has a limited focus on enhancing investor protection. This is
consistent with traditional views on this topic, which assume
that sophisticated investors are sufficiently capable of protecting
themselves.122 While the Dodd-Frank Act will require many

118

Letter from Richard H. Baker, President & CEO, Managed Funds Assoc., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Sept. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.managedfunds.org/downloads/MFA%20SEC%20Letter.9.22.10.pdf.
119
Id.
120
See Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(b) (2006).
121
See id. § 77q (making it unlawful to use fraud or deceit in the sale of
securities); see also id. §§ 77k, 77l (creating civil liability for false information in
registration statements and prospectuses); id. §§ 77j, 77e (listing the requirements
for a prospectus and prohibiting the use of any means of interstate commerce in the
absence of conformity with such requirements); id. §§ 77g, 77aa (listing disclosure
requirements for registration statements).
122
See infra Part IV.A.
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hedge fund advisers to register under the Advisers Act, this
section explains how this new requirement has a minimal impact
on investor protection. Furthermore, the various loopholes
created for this new registration requirement create additional
limitations.
1.

Limited Effect of Advisers Act Registration

The Advisers Act subjects advisers to certain disclosure and
record-keeping requirements with respect to their overall
advisory businesses, but it has a limited effect on the specific
activities of their respective funds.123 In contrast, registration
under the Company Act would give investors more information to
make better investment choices. More specifically, it would
subject registered funds to more rigorous disclosure
requirements, investment constraints, and standardized business
practices with respect to their actual trading activities.124
However, the Dodd-Frank Act does not require hedge funds to
register under the Company Act or impose any other comparable
restrictions. As a result, the overall impact of the Dodd-Frank
Act’s provisions on investor protection is minimal.
Advisers Act registration will likely enhance investor
protection by giving the SEC, and perhaps investors, more
information to better detect fraud. It will also subject registered
advisers to random SEC audits, which could serve as a deterrent
to fraudulent investment activities. However, SEC Chairman
Mary Schapiro recently stated that “[g]iven the SEC’s limited
resources, we have only been able to examine roughly 10 percent
of the investment advisers registered with us in each of the last
two years. The result is that many advisers registered with the
SEC are not examined regularly.”125 This statement indicates

123

See, e.g., Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-3 (discussing registration of
investment advisers), 80b-4 (discussing reporting by investment advisers) (West
2011).
124
See, e.g., Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-8 (discussing registration of
investment companies), 80a-12 (limiting functions and activities of investment
companies), 80a-14 (regulating size of investment companies), 80a-29 (discussing
reporting and financial statements of investment companies and their affiliated
persons) (West 2011).
125
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Opening Statement at the SEC Open
Meeting: Items 1 and 2—Proposals to Implement Investment Adviser Provisions of
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that ensuring compliance under the Advisers Act is a costly and
timely endeavor and as a result, fraudulent advisers have slipped
through the cracks. The most notable example of a fraudulent
adviser “slipping through the cracks” would be Bernard Madoff,
who swindled over $50 billion from sophisticated investors, even
though he was registered under the Advisers Act.126 Relatedly,
the various exemptions provided under the Dodd-Frank Act will
probably make it difficult for the SEC to detect hedge fund fraud
in funds where fraud is likely to occur.127
2.

Smaller Funds Escape Regulatory Oversight

Hedge fund advisers with less than $150 million in assets in
the United States under management will not have to register
under the Advisers Act and consequently, investors within these
funds will not be given the same protections.128 The SEC will
still retain its power to collect systemic risk data from these
exempt funds, but this information will not be given to
investors.129 As a result, private funds that fall within this
category could potentially be subject to oversight by the SEC, to
the extent that they pose a systemic risk to the economy.
However, it is not yet clear how the SEC intends to regulate such
private funds or whether the SEC will even gather systemic risk
data from any mid-sized funds that fall within this category.130

the Dodd-Frank Act (Nov. 19, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2010/spch111910mls-items1-2.htm.
126
David Ellis, Congress Looks for Answers in Madoff Scandal,
(Jan.
5,
2009,
5:49
PM),
CNNMONEY.COM
http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/05/news/companies/madoff_hearing/index.htm.
See
also Kara Scannell, States Will Be Hedge-Fund Police, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2010, at
C3.
127
See infra Part II.C.2.
128
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
129
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
130
On November 19, 2010, the SEC issued a proposed rule that would require
exempt reporting advisers to also publicly disclose basic identifying information,
certain business activities that create conflicts of interest, the adviser’s disciplinary
history, and other information regarding the private funds that they advise. See
Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers with Less
than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, 75
Fed. Reg. 77,190, 77,206–10 (Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 275)
[hereinafter SEC Proposal]. This new reporting requirement will not exempt such
advisers from other reporting requirements mandated under their respective states.
Id. at 77,192.
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Congress probably excluded these mid-sized funds from actual
registration under the Advisers Act because of its focus on
systemic risk, since smaller funds are less likely to create a
systemic risk event.131
However, with respect to investor protection issues, some
studies have found that smaller funds are much more likely to
commit investment adviser fraud.132 In fact, according to the
Alternative Investment Management Association (“AIMA”), most
hedge fund fraud cases involved advisers with $25,000,000 under
management.133 Furthermore, smaller funds are probably more
likely to commit investment adviser fraud134 because larger hedge
funds, which are more established within the hedge fund
industry, are subject to heightened scrutiny from institutional
investors.135 Smaller hedge funds generally do not attract as
many institutional investors as compared to their larger
counterparts.136 This is relevant because institutional investors
tend to perform more due diligence on their hedge fund
investments than individual high net-worth investors.137 This
heightened due diligence process inevitably holds such advisers
to a higher standard since their business practices are being
more closely scrutinized. In effect, if a hedge fund has a large
number of institutional investors that are demanding more
disclosures and greater transparency, then such advisers are less
likely to commit in fraudulent investment activities.

131

See SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 89, at 22–24.
See Matthew Lewis, A Transatlantic Dilemma: A Comparative Review of
American and British Hedge Fund Regulation, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 347, 372
(2008); Anuj Gangahar, SEC Rule Ignores Highest-Risk Category of Fund Fraud,
FIN. NEWS (Oct. 31, 2005), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2005-10-31/sec-ruleignores-highest-risk-category-of-fund-fraud.
133
Gangahar, supra note 132.
134
See id.; Scannell, supra note 126 (discussing how fraud is more likely to
happen with small managers than with larger managers).
135
See Netty Ismail, Institutions Damp Hedge Fund ‘Startup Spirit,’ Citi’s Roe
Says, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0221/hedge-funds-startups-slow-as-investors-demand-track-record-citigroup-says.html
(discussing institutional investors’ preference for large hedge funds).
136
Id.; Amanda Cantrell, Hedge Funds: A $25 Million Loophole: The New Hedge
Fund Rule Exempts Small Funds, and That Could Be Bad for Small Investors,
(Aug.
5,
2005,
2:20
PM),
CNNMONEY.COM
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/05/markets/hedge_regulation/index.htm.
137
See Lewis, supra note 132, at 368.
132
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In addition, advisers with less than $100 million of assets
under management will not qualify for federal registration and
will thus be subject to regulation by each respective state.138
However, the majority of hedge funds in existence have less than
$50 million in assets.139 Previously, advisers with less than $25
million in assets under management were delegated to the state
regulation.140 Many state regulators do not have the adequate
experience and/or resources to effectively regulate such a large
number of advisers.141 This will of course further limit the
likelihood of the detection of fraudulent behavior by state
regulators, which is exacerbated by the fact that such smaller
funds are less likely to have institutional investors that perform
“internal” regulation as briefly discussed above. This can also be
problematic from an investor’s perspective because this will
result in inconsistent disclosure for a large number of hedge
funds. As a result, it will be more difficult for hedge fund
investors to compare disclosures among hedge funds, even
though the SEC highlighted this as being an important concern
for hedge fund investors.
3.

Some Futures Funds Escape Regulatory Oversight

Traditional futures funds and other funds that hold a limited
amount of securities are not “private funds” under the DoddFrank Act, and thus are not required to register.142 These funds
are commonly referred to as “managed futures” funds and they
actively trade commodity futures and options on futures.143
Managed futures funds are excluded because they are primarily
regulated by of the Commodities Futures Trade Commission

138
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 410, 124 Stat. 1376, 1576 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
139
HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 168.
140
Scannell, supra note 126.
141
Id. (discussing how the states do not “have the budget or the manpower” to
monitor newly registered advisers).
142
Dodd-Frank Act § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
143
LINS ET AL., supra note 25, § 11:1.

WF_Martin (Do Not Delete)

2012]

SYSTEMIC RISK PREVENTION

12/17/2012 5:28 PM

111

(“CFTC”), which is the designated regulatory body for the futures
industry.144 Conversely, the SEC is the designated regulatory
body for the securities industry.145
The exclusion of managed futures funds from registration
under the Advisers Act was probably created in order to avoid
duplicative registration of hedge fund advisers by both the CFTC
and the SEC, even though the SEC previously disagreed with
this position.146 Duplicative regulation issues arise for hedge
fund advisers who trade in both securities and futures markets.
Despite the appropriate concerns regarding duplicative
regulation, there are also exemptions that managed futures
funds can rely on in order to avoid registration with both the
CFTC and the SEC which would in effect, exempt such managed
futures funds from any regulatory oversight. 147 The Dodd-Frank
Act attempts to limit duplicative regulation by requiring the
CFTC and the SEC to jointly promulgate rules governing
reporting requirements for advisers that are dually-registered,

144

Id.
See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC (last modified July 30,
2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
146
The SEC previously addressed this issue in its adopting release for the Hedge
Fund Rule, which has since been repealed. Registration Under the Advisers Act of
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,065 (Dec. 10, 2004). In this
release, the SEC noted:
We disagree that our oversight of hedge fund advisers that are also
commodity pool operators would be duplicative. Most hedge fund portfolios
consist primarily of securities, and the CFTC’s oversight necessarily
focuses more on the area of futures trading, which is the activity of most
concern to the CFTC. It would be inconsistent with principles of functional
regulation and contrary to the design and purpose of the 2000 amendments
to the Advisers Act for the Commission not to oversee hedge fund advisers
whose primary business is acting as an investment adviser.
Id.
147
17 C.F.R. §§ 4.13(a)(3), 4.13(a)(4), 4.7 (West 2011). The CFTC has recently
proposed rescinding and/or limiting certain of these CFTC exemptions, but this
proposal has not yet been deemed final as of October 2011. Commodity Pool
Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors: Amendments to Compliance
Obligations; Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 7976 (Feb. 11, 2011), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/20112437a.pdf.
145
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but it does not purport to address the regulatory loopholes for
hedge fund advisers that are exempt from both regulatory
agencies.148
The exclusion of exempt futures funds from regulatory
oversight can be problematic for two reasons. First, there has
been exponential growth of the number of traded futures over the
past ten years.149 If the futures industry continues to follow this
trajectory, then the number of managed futures funds could be
expected to grow which could create a substantial loophole for
such advisers. Second, futures contracts are traded using
margin, which is basically another form of leverage. Margin
“refers to the initial deposit of ‘good faith’ made into an account
in order to enter into a futures contract.”150 The amount of
margin required to secure a futures position is usually 5% to 10%
of the actual cash value of the contract.151 As a result, if the
closing price of a futures contract moves slightly away from an
adviser’s expectations, this can produce enormous losses
compared to such adviser’s initial margin deposit.152 This could
possibly lead to a situation where a fund’s losses exceed the
amount of capital invested in a particular fund, which would
inevitably lead to a fund’s failure.153 Since trading in the futures
market subjects investors to an increased risk of losing their total
investment, it seems logical that managed futures funds should
be subject to increased regulatory oversight. More importantly,
in the event that a fund’s losses exceed the amount of capital in a
futures fund, the banks that extended lines of credit to the hedge
fund to let it use leverage are going to incur such loss,154 which
further increases the likelihood of systemic risk.
By and large, the Dodd-Frank Act has a limited impact on
investor protection. This is made evident by the numerous
loopholes that were created from the new registration
148

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 406, 124 Stat. 1376, 1574 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(2)(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
149
STEFANINI, supra note 24, at 224.
150
Futures
Fundamentals:
Characteristics
Definition,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/futures/futures4.asp (last visited Sept. 13,
2012).
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
See LTCM REPORT, supra note 52, at 12.
154
STEFANINI, supra note 24, at 223.
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requirement, as well as the minimal effect that Advisers Act
registration has on investor protection. The Dodd-Frank Act was
likely focused on mitigating systemic risk, which leaves the more
complicated investor protection issues unresolved.
III. UNIQUE INVESTOR PROTECTION ISSUES THAT ARE NOT
CAPTURED BY THE DODD-FRANK ACT
This Part describes the unique investor protection issues
that hedge fund investors typically encounter and that are not
resolved by the Dodd-Frank Act. These issues involve the
growing complexity of the hedge fund industry as well as the
industry’s overall lack of standardization with respect to its
disclosure
practices,
risk
calculations,
and
valuation
mechanisms. These issues make it exceptionally difficult for
such investors to adequately assess the risk of a particular hedge
fund investment. In effect, this Part gives a detailed description
of each of these issues.
A.

Inability To Properly Assess Risk

Some academics have assumed that investor protection
principles should not be expanded to hedge fund investors since
many sophisticated investors spend anywhere from two to over
six months performing due diligence on a particular hedge
fund.155 Through this due diligence process, such investors
receive information that would otherwise be disclosed if such
hedge fund were registered. However, in a study that was
155

Paredes, supra note 12, at 992–93. This article also specifies that,
[a] 2004 study by Deutsche Bank found that nearly 40% of the hedge fund
investors surveyed spend an average of three to six months doing diligence
before investing, with 20% of those surveyed spending an average of six
months or more on diligence. Merely 3% of investors surveyed said they
spend less than one month doing diligence. Only 21% of Deutsche Bank’s
respondents said that they normally invest in a fund at its inception, with
the remaining 79% presumably waiting for the fund to develop a track
record to gauge performance. Pension plans reported, on average, that they
annually meet with about forty hedge fund managers in making only one to
three allocations, and the average for endowments was to interview about
ninety hedge fund managers a year to make just four to six allocations.
Managers of so-called “funds of hedge funds” reported that they sometimes
interview over 400 hedge fund managers to make just fifteen or so
allocations.

Id.
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conducted by the United States Government Accountability
Office on May 7, 2009, “some market participants suggested that
not all prospective investors have the capacity or retain the
expertise to analyze the information they receive from hedge
funds.”156
Many of the underlying financial instruments that are
traded by hedge funds have also become increasingly complex.
While some hedge funds employ low-risk trading strategies that
are relatively straightforward, other funds depend on high-risk
trading strategies that rely on complex derivatives to ensure
positive returns. For instance, a computer program could take
days to value certain collateralized debt obligations (“CDO”),157
which are investment vehicles that offer securitized interests in a
pool of loan or debt instruments.158 Similarly, collateralized
mortgage obligations, which are investment vehicles that offer
securitized interests in a pool of mortgages,159 are so complex that
counterparties within a CMO transaction could yield different
values for the same CMO interest.160
Also, since trading strategies of hedge funds tend to be
dynamic, it can be challenging for sophisticated investors to
properly assess the corresponding risk of these strategies. More
specifically, hedge funds can employ highly active strategies
where they are allowed to trade varying quantities of
instruments and leverage on a daily basis, and can alter their
investment strategies with minimal notification to investors.161
Accordingly, it is difficult for sophisticated investors to
adequately assess their risk exposure to hedge fund investments

156
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-677T, HEDGE FUNDS:
OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT, COUNTERPARTY RISKS, AND INVESTMENT
CHALLENGES 11 (2009) [hereinafter GAO STUDY], available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09677t.pdf.
157
Jennifer S. Taub, Enablers of Exuberance: Legal Acts and Omissions that
Facilitated the Global Financial Crisis 2 (Vt. Law Sch., Working Paper Series, 2009),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1472190.
158
Collateralized
Debt
Obligations
Definition,
RISKGLOSSARY.COM,
http://www.riskglossary.com/link/collateralized_debt_obligation.htm (last visited
Sept. 13, 2012).
159
Collateralized
Mortgage
Obligations,
SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/tcmos.htm (last modified Sept. 2, 2011).
160
See CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TWO TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY
MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 39–40 (2008).
161
See id.
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that employ dynamic trading strategies, even if they spend a
significant amount of time performing due diligence on a
particular fund.
B.

Limited Transparency

Hedge funds are not required to provide extensive
disclosures to their investors, while mutual funds are required to
deliver a prospectus to all investors under the Company Act.162 A
prospectus contains “valuable information, such as the fund’s
investment objectives or goals, principal strategies for achieving
those goals, principal risks of investing in the fund, fees and
expenses, and past performance.”163 Many hedge funds do
provide certain disclosures in order to comply with the anti-fraud
provisions under the Securities Act,164 Exchange Act165 and
Advisers Act.166 Such anti-fraud provisions apply even when
Many funds also
issuers are exempt from registration.167
voluntarily provide additional disclosures to their investors
because a number of sophisticated investors have started to
demand greater transparency.168 However, the level and degree
of such disclosure varies among funds and most do not disclose
the specific investment positions within their portfolios due to
the proprietary nature of their investments.169 This concern
arises from the possibility of third parties replicating their
strategies which could lead to significant losses for current hedge
fund investors.170 In addition, smaller hedge funds are not bound
162

Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, supra note 41, at 43; OFFICE OF
INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC, MUTUAL FUNDS: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS 18
(2007)
[hereinafter
Mutual
Fund
Guide],
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutual-funds.pdf.
163
Id.
164
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q (West 2011).
165
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2011); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (West
2011).
166
Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-6 (West 2011); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (West
2011); Shadab, supra note 79, at 286.
167
Shadab, supra note 79, at 286–87.
168
Greg MacSweeney, Investors Demand Hedge Fund Transparency, WALL
STREET & TECH. (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/assetmanagement/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=221600610.
169
Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A
Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 315–
16 (2007).
170
Id. at 316.
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by comparable demands for transparency because they are less
likely to attract larger institutional investors that have greater
bargaining power.171 Thus, while some larger institutional
investors are able to bargain for greater transparency, other
smaller investors are left to fend for themselves in a marketplace
that has grown increasingly complex.
C.

Inability To Adequately Compare Various Hedge Fund
Investments

Regulators often rely on mandatory disclosure, or other
comparable reporting mechanisms, as a tool for optimizing
investor protection. A mandatory disclosure regime forces a firm
to provide relevant information to its regulators, which would
help them to better detect investment adviser fraud. It also
ensures that investors have access to more reliable information
regarding their investments so that they can make more
informed investment decisions.172 The arguments in favor of a
mandatory disclosure regime often focus on the limitations of a
voluntary disclosure regime. For example, firms may not have a
great incentive to disclose relevant information voluntarily if
such information would shed a negative light on the firm’s
business.173 Even if information is disclosed voluntarily, they
may have a self interest in only providing disclosure that would
enhance their insider trading opportunities.174 In a similar vein,
voluntary disclosures may not encompass pertinent information
“coming from outside the disclosing firm.”175 Due to these
reasons, mandatory disclosure is thought to improve investor
welfare.176
However, one of the least discussed benefits of mandatory
disclosure, or other comparable reporting mechanisms, is the
ability for investors to compare the financial and risk data among

171

Cantrell, supra note 136.
SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 27 (1981).
173
STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 26 (2d ed. 2008).
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
172
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various firms.177 The ability to compare firms is repeatedly
stressed by the literature on financial statements analysis178 and
as indicated by Professor Sharon Hannes, is arguably one of the
most important aspects of a mandatory disclosure regime.179 As
she accurately points out, if investors are not able to adequately
compare the performance data and risk control practices of
multiple firms, then it is difficult to ascertain whether a
particular firm is competitive and whether it conforms to
industry standards.180 For example, a return of 10% may appear
favorable on its face, but if other comparable firms are earning
returns of 15%, then the 10% return may not be optimal. In
order for this benefit of mandatory disclosure to accrue to
investors, there of course needs to be a standardized format for
calculating data as well as a public disclosure system, or some
other comparable reporting mechanism, which would provide
investors and other analysts with access to such data.181
Moreover, the financial statements that are provided by hedge
funds are not required to comply with generally accepted
accounting principles or to be reviewed by a CPA.182
With respect to public companies, Congress delegated
authority to the SEC to promulgate finance reporting rules.183
The SEC in turn has delegated this function to the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), which is the agency that
177
Sharon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify
Mandatory Disclosure?, 29 J. CORP. L. 699, 702 (2004).
178
See MARY BUFFET & DAVID CLARK, WARREN BUFFETT AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: THE SEARCH FOR THE COMPANY WITH
A DURABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 73–74 (2008) (indicating that the financial
statements of a company provide whether it offers a competitive advantage that will
make for a good investment); ROBERT C. HIGGINS, ANALYSIS FOR FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 6–11 (9th ed. 2009) (explaining the mechanism of financial statement
analysis which is used by finance professionals to forecast performance and assess
future opportunities); see generally MARK E. HASKINS, THE SECRET LANGUAGE OF
FINANCIAL REPORTS: THE BACK STORIES THAT CAN ENHANCE YOUR INVESTMENT
DECISIONS 171–87 (2008) (providing detailed guidance on how to engage in financial
statement analysis to make better investment decisions).
179
Hannes, supra note 177.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global Financial Market
Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 29 (2007).
183
MARK E. HASKINS, THE SECRET LANGUAGE OF FINANCIAL REPORTS: THE
BACK STORIES THAT CAN ENHANCE YOUR INVESTMENT DECISIONS 5 (2008).
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issues specific guidelines on how to report specific financial
statement line items as well as any corresponding disclosures
within any applicable footnotes.184
The FASB has also
highlighted that uniform reporting standards contribute to better
functioning markets.185
The FASB specifically stated that,
“[Uniform] standards are important to the efficient functioning of
the economy because decisions about the allocation of resources
rely heavily on credible, concise, and understandable financial
information.”186
With respect to hedge fund industry, there is no
standardized mechanism for managers to calculate valuations or
to assess risk, which makes hedge fund comparisons extremely
difficult for investors. There is also no public disclosure regime,
or other reporting mechanism, that would require all hedge funds
to report such information. This point is further exacerbated by
the fact that hedge fund managers are prohibited from
advertising, which means that they are forbidden from
voluntarily disclosing relevant information to the public
marketplace.187 Hedge fund investors primarily rely on hedge
fund marketing activities, limited index reports, and extensive
due diligence inspections as the main sources of information
regarding these investments.188 As a result, the process for
determining whether a hedge fund investment is optimal is
expensive and unreliable. This creates inefficiencies with respect
to the value and quality of hedge fund investments, which is
problematic since many institutional investors, such as pension
plans, insurance companies, and endowments, see hedge funds as
a valuable component of their underlying investment strategies.
This is also problematic to the extent that hedge funds are
184

Id.
See Facts About FASB, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.fasb.org/
jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495 (last visited Sept. 13, 2012).
186
Id.
187
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2008). See Roel C. Campos, SEC Comm’r, Remarks
Before the Hedge Fund Institutional Forum Corporate Funds Roundtable (Mar. 5,
2007),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030507rcc.htm
(discussing the possibility of eliminating prohibition on advertising to promote
transparency in hedge fund industry).
188
See generally PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND INVESTORS:
REPORT OF THE INVESTORS’ COMMITTEE TO THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2009), available at http://www.amaicmte.org/Public/
Investors%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf.
185
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actually providing benefits to the overall marketplace by
eradicating price inefficiencies, providing liquidity for various
financial instruments, and by providing capital for new
companies and industries.189 This issue deserves heightened
attention since there are approximately 18,000 hedge funds in
existence; although this number cannot be verified since there is
no public disclosure regime, or other reporting mechanism, that
will require all hedge funds to register.190 Overall, the hedge
fund industry seems to be the only industry, with as many
participants, that does not have an organizational or regulatory
structure broadly supporting it.191
In February 2007, the President’s Working Group on
Financial Markets (“PWG”) released a set of principles and
guidelines that were designed to assist regulators in the
development of hedge fund regulations.192
The following
“Investor Protection Principle” was included in this agreement:
“Sophisticated investors that determine to invest in a private
pool of capital should ensure that the size of their investment is
consistent with their investment objectives and the principle of
portfolio diversification.”193 However, this principle cannot be
fully realized if sophisticated investors cannot adequately
compare various hedge fund investments. Since the Dodd-Frank
Act does not include standardized valuation and risk practices,
and will exempt many advisers from registration, investors will
be limited in their abilities to optimize their hedge fund
investments.

189

GAO STUDY, supra note 156, at 13–14.
PERTRAC’S 2009 HEDGE FUND DATABASE STUDY, supra note 14.
191
HORWITZ, supra note 15.
192
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, President’s Working Group
Releases Agreement Detailing Common Approach to Private Pools of Capital (Feb.
22, 2007), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
20072221434566971.aspx.
193
Agreement Among PWG and U.S. Agency Principals on Principles and
Guidelines Regarding Private Pools of Capital, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 1–2,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hp272_principles.pdf
(last visited Sept. 13, 2012) [hereinafter PWG Agreement].
190
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D. Lack of Standardized Valuation Mechanisms
Valuation generally refers to the mechanisms through which
a firm determines the current value of its assets.194 Since hedge
fund managers are compensated based on the overall value of the
fund’s assets, which in turn affects the performance results of a
fund, there is a general concern that such managers have an
incentive to inflate valuations.195 This issue is even more
problematic with respect to hedge fund investments because they
often trade illiquid assets for which there is no readily available
market quotation.196 Moreover, hedge fund managers have great
discretion to utilize their own valuation policies, as they are not
required to use a third-party valuation agent or adhere to a
standardized set of valuation policies.197 Most hedge fund
offering materials do contain provisions that explain the
manager’s valuation policies.
However, these provisions
generally lack the specificity that investors need in order to
effectively evaluate such policies.198 In addition, the hedge fund
manager usually has discretion to deviate from the provided
valuation policies when deemed necessary, making the
disclosures even more ineffective.199
Many academics, industry groups and even regulators have
recognized the need for better hedge fund valuation policies and
procedures.200 For example, the MFA, which is a leading
advocate for sound business practices within the hedge fund
industry, issued a best practices manual for hedge funds in
194

Valuation Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/
valuation.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2012).
195
See Kent Oz, Note, Independent Fund Administrators as a Solution for Hedge
Fund Fraud, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 329, 350 n.166 (2009).
196
See id. at 335.
197
See Ryan Sklar, Note, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from Hedge
Fund Managers’ Conflicts of Interest, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3251, 3268 (2009).
198
Id.
199
Id. at 3268–69.
200
See IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 41, at viii;
Susan M. Mangiero, Hedge Fund Valuation: What Pension Fiduciaries Need to
Know, J. COMPENSATION & BENEFITS, Aug. 2006, at 20, available at
http://www.bvallc.com/pdf/hedgefund2006.pdf (stressing the importance of pension
plans becoming familiar with hedge fund valuation procedures); The SEC Isn’t
Finished with Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 17, 2006),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_29/b3993055.htm
(discussing
the difficulties associated with the subjective valuation procedures for certain assets
traded by hedge funds). See generally Sklar, supra note 197.
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2009.201 This manual includes recommendations that fund
valuations be “fair, consistent, and verifiable.”202 The Asset
Managers’ Committee, under the direction of the President’s
Working Group, even issued a best practices report on January
15, 2009, which recommends “[r]obust valuation procedures that
call for a segregation of responsibilities, thorough written
policies, oversight and other measures for the valuation of assets,
including a specific focus on hard-to-value assets.”203 Despite
these numerous recommendations, the Dodd-Frank Act does not
address the valuation issue.204 While it is difficult to create a
uniform standard for all hedge fund investments since the
strategies employed by hedge funds are heterogeneous and
distinct from traditional investments, it is vital that certain
standards are developed and applied consistently. This can
perhaps be achieved by requiring third-party oversight for
valuation procedures, by creating separate valuation procedures
for different types of instruments, or by adopting the models
proposed by the MFA or other similar organizations.
E.

Lack of Standardized Risk Management Practices

In addition to evaluating the returns of hedge fund
investments, sophisticated investors are also looking for ways to
compare and aggregate risks across a number of portfolios.205
The four components of risk that sophisticated investors
201
MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, SOUND PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND MANAGERS 1
(2009), available at http://www.managedfunds.org/files/pdf’s/MFA_Sound_Practices_
2009.pdf [hereinafter MFA BEST PRACTICES GUIDE].
202
Id. at 7.
203
BEST PRACTICES FOR THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY: REPORT OF THE ASSET
MANAGERS’ COMMITTEE TO THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL
MARKETS
iii
(2009),
available
at
http://www.amaicmte.org/Public/AMC%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf.
204
It should be noted that under the SEC Proposal, the SEC mandates a
uniform method for calculating “regulatory assets under management” for purposes
of determining whether advisers can rely on certain exemptions. However, advisers
can deviate from this method for purposes of calculating their fees and returns,
which is how investors typically measure the success of a particular fund. In
addition, this uniform measure is not required for other disclosures that are
voluntarily given to investors. As a clarification, “assets under management”
generally includes all assets that a particular adviser manages, which could
encompass multiple funds. As a result, this proposal does not create a uniform
measure on a fund-by-fund basis.
205
See HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 2.
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generally evaluate include volatility, diversification, leverage,
and liquidity.206 Volatility refers to the amount of uncertainty
associated with the value of a particular investment, while
diversification refers to the extent to which a portfolio includes a
wide variety of investments.207 Leverage refers to the ratio of a
firm’s debt to its equity capital,208 while illiquidity refers to
whether an investment could be easily sold or exchanged for cash
without a substantial loss in value.209 Another category of risk
that is not subject to quantitative analysis is “operational risk[ ]”
which “include[s] organizational aspects such as the reliability of
back-office operations, legal infrastructure, accounting and trade
reconciliation, personnel issues, and the day-to-day management
of the business.”210 Operational risks have recently gained more
attention since most hedge fund failures result from operational
inefficiencies.211
Various models can be used to measure each of these risk
components. However, with respect to the hedge fund industry,
there is no standardized format for measuring or reporting the
various types of risks created by hedge fund investments.212
Moreover, hedge funds are not required to disclose specific
information with respect to their specific risk calculations or

206

Id. at 3.
Volatility Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/
volatility.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2012); Diversification Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/diversification.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2012).
208
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
209
Illiquid Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/
illiquid.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2012).
210
Andrew W. Lo, Risk Management for Hedge Funds: Introduction and
Overview 31 (Working Paper Series 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=283308.
211
See Gareth Jones, Operational Due Diligence: Increased Demands for Hedge
Fund Managers and Investors, THE HEDGE FUND J. (June 2010),
http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/magazine/201006/opinion/operational-duediligence.php.
212
See Pearson & Pearson, supra note 182, at 47–48. This point is reiterated by
Mark J.P. Anson, a senior investment officer with CalPERS, a prominent
institutional investor. He states that “there is no standard platform for measuring
risk and no standard format for reporting it. . . . Consequently, the risks of several
hedge fund managers cannot be combined.” Mark J.P. Anson, Hedge Fund Risk
Management for Institutions, in MANAGING HEDGE FUND RISK: FROM THE SEAT OF
THE PRACTITIONER—VIEWS FROM INVESTORS, COUNTERPARTIES, HEDGE FUNDS AND
CONSULTANTS 19, 21 (Virginia Reynolds Parker ed., 2000).
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methodologies.213 As a result, it is difficult for hedge fund
investors to compare a variety of hedge fund risk exposures,
which makes harder to achieve optimal risk allocations. While
the PWG recognized that “[i]nvestors should understand their
investments and the corresponding risks, and should not expose
themselves to risk levels they cannot tolerate,”214 the Dodd-Frank
Act does little to ensure that investors are given the appropriate
tools to properly assess risk.
F.

Information Asymmetries Create a “Lemons” Market

The above investor protection issues create distinct
information asymmetries between advisers and investors. These
asymmetries have possibly created a “market for lemons” within
the hedge fund industry.215 Essentially, a “market for lemons” is
created when individuals within a particular market buy goods
or services without knowing the true quality of such goods or
services.216
The sellers within these markets have more
knowledge about the quality of their goods than the buyers.217 As
a result, the high quality goods and the low quality goods will
inevitably end up selling at the same price since the buyer cannot
tell the difference between a high quality good and a low quality
good.218 This would in turn push out the higher quality goods
since they would not be rewarded for their superiority.219
With respect to the hedge fund industry, the lack of
standardized valuation and risk reporting mechanisms make it
difficult for investors to know the true value of such investments.
As a result, it is possible that certain hedge funds with different
qualities will have the same price, because investors are not
aware of the true value of a hedge fund investment.220 The value
of a hedge fund is frequently measured by the extent to which a
213

See id.
PWG Agreement, supra note 193, at 2.
215
George A. Akerlof, The Market For “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488, 488 (1970).
216
Id.
217
Id. at 488–89.
218
Id. at 489.
219
Id. at 489–90.
220
Martin Wolf, Why Today’s Hedge Fund Industry May Not Survive, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2008), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c8941ad4-f503-11dc-a21b000077b07658.html#axzz1ahuRDXfA.
214
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manager’s skill or talent contributes to the actual returns
exhibited by a particular fund.221 However, it is possible for a
hedge fund manager to temporarily earn high returns by using a
probability analysis to place bets on certain market events,
without developing a long-term and legitimate investment
plan.222 For example, if a manager with no investment talent
uses a probability analysis to determine that it is highly unlikely
that the S&P 500 index will fall more than 20%, the manager
could write options on this unlikely S&P event and sell them in
the marketplace.223 Thus, if the S&P 500 does not tank, the
manager will be able to keep the money earned from selling the
options and this will increase the fund’s returns.224 On the other
hand, in the rare event that the S&P 500 tanks, the manager will
have to use the fund’s assets to pay the option-holders who were
on the opposite end of the bet.225 If this happens, the investors
will have lost the total value of their initial investments.226
Since investors often evaluate hedge funds by comparing
their returns, without having the tools to effectively evaluate
and/or compare hedge funds’ valuation and risk policies, it is
difficult to differentiate a talented manager from an
unscrupulous one. These issues could be partially addressed
through implementing standardized business practices and
improving the transparency of all hedge funds, regardless of their
asset sizes. The Dodd-Frank Act does little to address these
issues since it seems to be primarily focused on mitigating
systemic risk, as opposed to enhancing investor protection.
IV. THE BROADER IMPACT OF HEDGE FUND INVESTMENTS
This Part explains why hedge fund investors should be
entitled to greater investor protection under our federal
securities laws. While Part III supports this view by explaining
221

STEFANINI, supra note 24, at 12.
Gaming the System: Are Hedge Fund Managers Talented, or Just Good at
(Apr.
2,
2008),
Fooling
Investors?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1931&jsessionid=9a3077a
90249657e225f.
223
Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young, Hedge Fund Wizards, ECONOMISTS’
VOICE, Feb. 2008, at 1.
224
Id. at 1–2.
225
Id. at 2.
226
Id.
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how the hedge fund industry can create undue risk for
sophisticated investors, this Part explains how the losses of such
investors can extend to other market participants, such as retail
investors, as well as to the general public. For example, many
pension plans that invest in hedge funds could expose their
underlying investors to excessive risks. In addition, the SEC
uses a significant amount of its resources to monitor the hedge
fund industry, even though sophisticated investors are presumed
to be sufficiently capable of protecting themselves. These costs
could be mitigated if sophisticated investors were provided
greater protections that would enable them to make better
investment choices. More importantly, since our markets are
inextricably connected, the overall stability of the entire economy
can be adversely impacted by such losses. For these reasons,
expanding investor protection principles to hedge fund investors
will help to protect the overall integrity of our security markets.
This Part further explains each of these issues.
A.

Hedge Fund Fraud

The SEC uses a significant portion of its resources
investigating and prosecuting fraudulent hedge fund advisers.227
While hedge funds are subject to the anti-fraud provisions under
the federal securities laws,228 these laws failed to prevent the
occurrence of multiple instances of hedge fund fraud. For
example, from 1999 to 2004, the SEC investigated fifty-one cases
involving hedge fund fraud, which caused investors to lose over
$1.1 billion.229 More recently, from 2006 to the first four months
of 2009, the SEC investigated eighty-four cases of hedge fund
fraud.230 Thus, the number of these investigations has actually
increased in recent years. A current example of hedge fund fraud
occurred during the financial crisis, when the SEC charged two
former Bear Stearns Hedge Fund managers with fraud for
227
See, e.g., Linda Chatman Thomsen et al., Hedge Funds: An Enforcement
Perspective, 39 RUTGERS L. J. 541, 542 (2008). This article is authored by members of
the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. Id. at 1. It provides a detailed analysis of the
various kinds of SEC enforcement cases that have been brought against hedge fund
advisers. See generally id.
228
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
229
See Jane J. Kim, Digging for Hedge-Fund Dirt, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2005, at
C1.
230
Commissioner Aguilar Speech, supra note 4.
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misleading investors about the funds’ financial state.231 In this
case, the investors suffered approximately $1.8 billion in losses
after these funds took highly leveraged trades within the
subprime mortgage backed securities markets.232 The SEC
further alleges that
when the hedge funds took increasing hits to the value of their
portfolios during the first five months of 2007 and faced
escalating redemptions and margin calls, then-[Bear Stern
Asset Management] senior managing directors Ralph R. Cioffi
and Matthew M. Tannin deceived their own investors and
certain institutional counterparties about the funds’ growing
troubles.233

Andrew J. Donohue reiterated the limitations of relying on
these anti-fraud provisions to adequately protect investors by
stating: “It is not uncommon that our first contact with a [hedge
fund] manager of a significant amount of assets is during an
investigation by our Enforcement Division.”234 Thus, the antifraud provisions within the securities laws fail to adequately
protect sophisticated investors. If these investors had greater
protections at the outset of the transaction, then they might be
able to better detect fraudulent hedge fund activities before
disaster hits. This would in turn preserve the resources that the
SEC uses to investigate these claims.

231

Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Two Former Bear Stearns Hedge Fund
Managers with Fraud (June 19, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2008/2008-115.htm.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Testimony Concerning Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment
Pools, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs (July 15, 2009) (statement of Andrew J.
Donohue, Director, Division of Investment Management, SEC), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts071509ajd.htm.
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Increased Exposure to Retail Investors and Other
Constituents

Many academics, as well as the SEC, have highlighted the
risk of retail investors235 being indirectly exposed to hedge funds
since pension plans, insurance companies, charitable trusts, and
other institutional investors have been increasingly investing
into these vehicles.236 A 2007 study revealed that institutional
investors account for over 50% of hedge fund investments.237
However, a more recent study revealed that institutional
investors account for over 61% of total hedge fund investments,
and will continue to increase in upcoming years.238 Additionally,
one source found that fund-of-funds accounted for 30% of the
total amount of assets in the hedge fund industry.239 As
background, fund-of-funds are investment vehicle structures that
are available to retail investors, even though they directly invest
into a large number of underlying hedge funds.240 Furthermore,
two-thirds of endowments241 have significant hedge fund
235

Retail investors are individuals who purchase small amounts of securities for
themselves, as opposed to institutional investors. Retail Investor Definition,
INVESTOR WORDS, http://www.investorwords.com/4231/retail_investor.html (last
visited Sept. 15, 2012).
236
Testimony Concerning Investor Protection and the Regulation of Hedge Funds
Advisers, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs (July
15, 2004) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Former Chairman, SEC), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts071504whd.htm; Christopher Cox Testimony,
supra note 46 (specifying that “the investor protection issues that stem from the
increasing exposure of retail investors to hedge fund investment opportunities”);
Alexander R. Roche, The Regulator Strikes Back: A Look at the SEC’s Most Recent
Attempt To Regulate Hedge Funds and What It Missed, 33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 145,
153 (2007).
237
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks of Under Secretary for
Domestic Finance Robert K. Steel on Private Pools of Capital (Feb. 27, 2007),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp280.aspx.
238
Madison Marriage, Institutional Investors Driving Investment in Hedge
Funds, HEDGE FUND REV. (Feb. 12, 2011), http://www.hedgefundsreview.com/hedgefunds-review/news/2025856/institutional-investors-driving-investment-hedge-funds.
239
Jane J. Kim, Hedge Funds Target Smaller Investors: As Cheaper Options
Proliferate, Some Doubt the Gains Can Last, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2005, at D1.
240
Ryan
Barnes,
Hedge
Funds
Go
Retail,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/07/mutual_fund_retail.asp
(last
visited on Sept.. 15, 2012).
241
Endowment
Definition,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/endowment.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2012)
(defining endowment as “[a] financial asset donation made to a non-profit group or
institution in the form of investment funds or other property that has a stated
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investments.242 Many non-profit groups, academic institutions,
and other organizations rely on endowments to support their
various functions.243 Overall, these institutional investors, as
opposed to wealthy individuals, are becoming the dominant
investor class within the hedge fund industry.244
While the overall impact on retail investors is not entirely
clear, it goes without question that they are increasingly being
exposed to hedge fund investments. Moreover, some analysts
predict that losses incurred by these institutional investors
“could eventually lead to reduced payouts to retirees, higher
taxes so state governments can fulfill their promises, or less cash
available for colleges to give out as financial aid.”245 For example,
in April 2006, San Diego’s pension fund incurred significant
losses when its underlying hedge fund investments were
overexposed to losses in the natural gas industry.246 The pension
plan’s strategy included a group of hedge funds, which initially
helped the plan to achieve higher returns than the rest of its
portfolio.247 However, the subsequent losses of those hedge funds
caused the pension fund to incur corresponding losses that
adversely impacted its 33,000 county workers.248 Those county
workers were all retail investors, who had no control over the
underlying investments of the pension fund, which of course, was
deemed a sophisticated investor. The pension fund may not have
had sufficient knowledge of the hedge funds’ overexposure to
certain natural gas trades since the hedge funds were not
required to fully disclose their trading positions or leverage
purpose at the bequest of the donor. Most endowments are designed to keep the
principal amount intact while using the investment income from dividends for
charitable efforts”).
242
Christopher Cox Testimony, supra note 46.
243
DIANA S. NEWMAN, NONPROFIT ESSENTIALS: ENDOWMENT BUILDING xiv
(2005).
244
Barnes, supra note 240.
245
Rachel Beck & Joe Bel Bruno, College, State Pension Funds, Endowments Are
Hurting, USA TODAY (Dec. 3, 2008, 9:01 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/
retirement/2008-12-03-pension-funds-endowments_N.htm.
246
Mary Williams Walsh, Pension Fund Tallies Losses and Rethinks Its
Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2006, at C4.
247
Id.
248
Id.; see also Rami Grunbaum, Offshore Hedge Fund Is Trouble for Seattle’s
TIMES
(Apr.
10,
2010,
10:02
PM),
Pension
Fund,
SEATTLE
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2011570587_sundaybuzz1
1.html.
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exposure. If the pension fund and/or fund’s underlying investors
were privy to this information, the subsequent losses could have
been prevented. In effect, you cannot increase protection to retail
investors, without directly protecting sophisticated investors,
since the sophisticated investors—which include pensions plans
and other institutions—are, in essence, controlling the
investment of the retail investor.
C.

Increased Exposure to the Entire Economy

Sophisticated investors have a history of suffering significant
losses and those losses can have an adverse impact on the entire
economy. The losses of several notable sophisticated investors
also facilitated and magnified the most recent financial crisis.
For instance, multiple sophisticated investors were exposed to
the severe losses incurred by AIG,249 which is a prominent global
insurance company that was overextended in the credit default
swap (“CDS”) market. A CDS is a derivative instrument where a
protection party—in this case, AIG—insures against the losses of
a purchasing party who engages in certain debt transactions.250
The purchasing party pays the protection party a periodic
premium, while the protection party promises to pay the
purchasing party’s debt in the event of a default.251 Protection
parties collect a stream of premiums from multiple
counterparties, with the hope that such parties do not
simultaneously default on their underlying debts.252 However,
AIG issued $440 billion in CDS while the real estate market
suffered unprecedented losses.253 As a result, many of these CDS
holders began to demand payment by AIG, but AIG could not
fulfill their end of the bargain.254 When AIG subsequently
collapsed, many of the primary CDS holders, which included
prominent investment banks, hedge funds, and other insurance

249

Lynn Stout, How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Reregulating Them Can Prevent Another, LOMBARD ST., July 6, 2009, at 4, 4.
250
DURBIN, supra note 62, at 64.
251
Id.
252
Id. at 73.
253
Christopher Cox, Op-Ed., Swapping Secrecy for Transparency, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2008, at WK.12.
254
Id.
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companies, were exposed to severe financial distress.255 The
government had to employ a $180 billion bailout plan to prevent
a severe systemic risk event.256
While the CDS market is currently being subject to a new
regulatory framework under the Dodd-Frank Act,257 the AIG
example highlights the impact that the aggregate losses of
sophisticated investors can have on the entire economy. By and
large, the recent financial crisis was exacerbated by the losses of
sophisticated investors.258 These losses had a monumental effect
on the integrity of our markets and the general public felt its
devastating effects. Yet, retail investors did not have access to
many of the markets and/or transactions that facilitated the
crisis because they were excluded from this sector of the
economy. While it is arguable that greed motivated the poor
decisions of sophisticated investors, it is clear that many of these
investors did not fully understand the risks entailed within these
complex transactions. Thus, removing the assumption that
sophisticated investors can fend for themselves is an essential
step towards creating a more efficient regulatory regime. As
proposed in this Article, a regulatory approach that improves
investor protection for sophisticated investors would inevitably
lead to better functioning markets.
V.

ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

This Part proposes an alternative regulatory framework that
begins with the retooling of certain private fund exemptions
under the Dodd-Frank Act. As further explained in this section,
this framework would also necessitate the creation of an SRO
that would be primarily responsible for the development of
uniform and mandatory measures of valuation and risk. This
section continues by exposing the limitations associated with this
proposal and provides a brief cost-benefit analysis. It concludes
by addressing the counterarguments that would likely follow this
framework.

255

Stout, supra note 249.
Id.
257
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
258
See Carl Hulse, House Approves Tougher Rules on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2009, at A1.
256
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Retooling Private Fund Exemptions

Since investor protection issues apply to all hedge funds,
each hedge fund should be subject to heightened regulation
regardless of its asset size. Accordingly, the exemption of
advisers with less than $150 million of assets under management
should be repealed. Advisers who manage between $25 million
and $100 million in assets should also remain subject to federal
registration, as opposed to being regulated by the states. This
would essentially revert to the previous standard where the
states regulated advisers who had less than $25 million in assets
under management.259 Also, futures funds that are exempt from
registration with the CFTC should at least be subject to
regulation by the SEC, or another regulatory body. Thus, the
definition of private fund under the Dodd-Frank Act should be
revised so that it captures such exempt funds.
B.

Creation of an SRO for Hedge Funds

An SRO is “a non-governmental organization that has the
power to create and enforce industry regulations and standards.
The priority is to protect investors through the establishment of
rules that promote ethics and equality.”260 The federal securities
laws were designed to incorporate self-regulation as a primary
component of securities regulation because it is more cost
effective.261 The SEC also found SRO’s to be more cost effective
because the complexities of securities trading practices made it
more practical for private industry participants to be directly
involved with rulemaking.262 Relatedly, since the SRO members
are more familiar with their own business practices, they would
likely set heightened business conduct standards that exceeded
259

See General Information on the Regulation of Investment Advisers, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iaregulation/memoia.htm (last visited Sept.
15, 2012); see also James E. Bedar et al., Alert: SEC Announces New Rules
Regulating Private-Fund Advisers, BROWN RUDNICK (June 30, 2011),
http://www.brownrudnick.com/uploads/114/doc/Brown_Rudnick_SEC_Announces_Ne
w_Rules_Regulating_Private-Fund_Advisers_6-11.pdf.
260
Self-Regulatory
Organization
Definition,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sro.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).
261
Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Release No. 34-50700, 17
C.F.R. § 240 (Mar. 8, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/3450700.htm#P73_6136.
262
Id.
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those that would have been imposed by the SEC.263 Furthermore,
since the final SRO decisions are subject to final approval by the
SEC, it is the perfect combination of federal and private
oversight.264 Due to the unique investor protection issues that
arise from hedge fund investments, an SRO should be created,
which would be primarily responsible for establishing various
rules and standards within the hedge fund industry.265 Under
the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress has already instructed the SEC to
prepare a study to evaluate whether the creation of a SRO for
private advisers would be beneficial to investors.266
The first task of this SRO would be to establish standardized
valuation mechanisms and risk measurements that would be
mandatory for all registered private funds. Of course, the
standards created by this SRO would remain subject to final
approval by the SEC.267 Industry participants are probably in a
better position to create these standards since the hedge fund
industry is heterogeneous and entails risks that are
distinguishable from traditional investments. The creation of an
SRO would give industry participants an opportunity to
implement some of the various models that have already been
developed. This SRO could also assist the CFTC and the SEC
with resolving the inefficiencies that result from the dual
regulation of certain funds.
This new SRO would probably be similar to the industrywide organizations that already exist. For example, many of the
larger and more prominent funds have become members of
organizations such as the MFA and the AIMA. The MFA’s
members “include the vast majority of the largest hedge fund
groups in the world who manage a substantial portion of the
approximately $1.5 trillion invested in absolute return
strategies” and are “the leading advocate[s] for sound business

263

Id.
See Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies Be Subject to a New
Statutory Self-Regulatory Organization?, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1115, 1120 (2005).
265
See also J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund
Regulation, Part II, A Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 814 (2007)
(discussing the additional benefits of implementing an SRO for hedge funds).
266
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 416, 124 Stat. 1376, 1579 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 80b-18c (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
267
See id.
264
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practices and industry growth.”268 The AIMA’s members include
“hedge fund manager members [who] manage in excess of 75% of
global hedge fund assets and 70% of global fund of hedge funds
assets.”269 These organizations have already created education,
regulation, policy development, and sound practices that can be
used by institutional investors, policymakers, and supervisors.270
C.

Develop a Risk Database for Hedge Funds

Once the SRO creates standardized valuation and risk
measures, it should create a risk database that would include the
new standardized risk measures that will have been adopted and
implemented by all registered private funds. Such risk measures
would be tabulated and made available to interested investors in
some general form. The database would not be publicly available
on the SEC’s website since retail investors are prohibited from
investing directly into hedge funds, which are private investment
vehicles. Additionally, this risk database should be constructed
so that the proprietary holdings of hedge funds are protected.
This would also prevent “herding” behavior of hedge fund
advisers since the additional disclosures would be primarily
focused on risk and valuations.
While it would admittedly be difficult to develop uniform
measures of risk for the multiple types of hedge fund investments
that currently exist, it is certainly feasible. One example of a
risk-reporting model was developed by Kenmar, a global
investment management and fund of hedge funds firm.271 This
model is called the “Risk Fundamentals Solution” and it
described as follows:
The system is a sophisticated risk management application that
uses a standard template to create a comprehensive risk profile
of the fund without disclosing any position data. The system
automatically tracks the fundamental risk measures over time

268

About
Managed
Funds
Association,
MANAGEDFUNDS.ORG,
http://www.managedfunds.org/forum2011/about-mfa-forum-2011.asp (last visited
Sept. 15, 2012).
269
Global Hedge Fund Industry Employs 300,000 People, AIMA (Dec. 10, 2010),
http://www.aima.org/en/media/press-releases.cfm/id/5A158030-55AA-4D8EBEE0E03BC0379A0F.
270
See id.
271
HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 250–51.
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and compares each measure to those of the fund’s peer group
and the universe of hedge funds. The risk profile includes
measures of: [r]eturns[,] [l]iquidity[,] [l]everage[,] [r]isk-factor
sensitivity[,] [v]olatility[,] [d]iversification[,] [r]isk-adjusted
return[,] [v]alue at [r]isk[,] [s]tress tests[, and p]erformance
attribution[.] The system can automatically distribute these
risk profiles electronically. These risk profiles can be compared
and aggregated across funds to analyze the risks of a portfolio of
funds.272

The Risk Fundamentals Solution model is an example of a
reporting framework that creates consistent and reliable
measures of risks for various categories of hedge fund
investments. While it is noted that the effectiveness of this
model warrants additional research that is outside the scope of
this Article, this example demonstrates that a risk reporting
framework, which does not expose the positions of hedge funds, is
feasible. It also proves that regulators can work with industry
participants to explore and develop unique solutions that
partially eradicate these unique investor protection issues that
the hedge fund industry has created.
By and large, this risk database system would ensure that
sophisticated investors can adequately compare various hedge
fund investments. It would allow such investors to compare a
specific fund with the overall distribution of risk for all hedge
funds, or for subsets of funds that employ a particular
investment strategy. In addition, giving this information to the
SEC would allow it to see if there was a more general systemic
risk issue with respect to a single hedge fund or subset of funds.
This framework would also allow analysts and other industry
specialists that represent the interests of sophisticated investors
to better monitor hedge fund activities and assist with the
prevention of investment adviser fraud and systemic risk.
Moreover, it could reduce the information asymmetries that have
led to the creation of a “lemons market” and limit the ability of
hedge fund managers to control the marketplace.273 Essentially,
272

Id.
See Barry W. Rashkover & Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman, SEC Enforcement
and Examinations Concerning Hedge Funds, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 599 (2008). This
article specifically states that
[SEC] Examiners also have recently shown interest in how portfolio
managers share information and ideas with non-affiliated portfolio
273
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this reporting system would lower the search costs associated
with finding an optimal hedge fund investment. This would
increase the capacity of investors to make informed decisions,
which should in turn improve the overall process of marketing
such funds.
D. Limitations
Since the hedge fund industry is heterogeneous, and thus
engages in a large range of trading activities and strategies, it
will admittedly be difficult to create standardized mechanisms
for valuation and risk. However, most hedge funds fall within
certain identifiable categories, so different mechanisms can be
developed for each particular investment strategy. Different
mechanisms can also apply to certain asset classes that are
frequently traded by hedge funds. With respect to risk measures,
hedge funds should be able to produce consistent numbers that
reflect its leverage exposure, volatility, and diversification,
despite the fact that the industry is heterogeneous.
It will also be difficult to determine the ideal methodologies
for the reporting framework since hedge fund advisers have
various preferences for measuring risk and calculating
valuations. However, this is a necessary task that has been
undertaken by other notable organizations. For example, FASB
issues specific guidelines on how to report specific financial
statement line items as well as any corresponding disclosures
within any applicable footnotes.274 Actual industry participants
are in the best position to develop these methodologies, since the
SEC has limited expertise in these areas. While the final
methodologies will remain subject to SEC approval, the SRO will
maintain responsibility for developing the initial framework.

managers. The concern appears to be that due to the size of the hedge fund
industry in general and the magnitude of assets controlled by certain funds
in particular, hedge funds are now in a position not only to control
companies but to move markets—especially if two or more funds comprise a
“group” working together to maximize return with respect to a specific
issuer or strategy.
Id. at 620–21.
274
Id. at 624 n.175.
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Cost-Benefit Analysis

The proposed alternative framework, which includes the
creation of an SRO, should be subject to a detailed cost-benefit
analysis to ensure that the marginal costs of implementing this
system do not exceed the marginal benefits. Professor Howell E.
Jackson from Harvard Law School gives helpful guidance on how
to implement this analysis in his article, Variation in the
Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and
Potential Implications.275 He also exposes some of the inherent
challenges of implementing a cost-benefit analysis for financial
regulation.276 For example, it is difficult to measure the private
costs of regulation with respect to the “incremental costs that
financial institutions incur beyond the levels of effort they would
expend in the absence of regulation” and the “transactions that
regulatory intervention unintentionally deters.”277 As Professor
Jackson further notes, it is difficult to measure the benefits of
protecting the general public and eliminating externalities from
financial failure.278 Despite these challenges, it is still important
to analyze these issues when developing a new framework for
financial regulation. Thus, this section will analyze the extent to
which the benefits of developing this system outweigh the actual
costs.
1.

Costs

There would be significant costs associated with the creation
of a new SRO for hedge funds. However, the SEC is already set
to incur significant costs in monitoring newly registered advisers
and collecting and analyzing systemic risk data from registered
hedge fund advisers. In addition, the SEC will have to use its
resources to create reliable measures of systemic risk and to
determine which hedge funds pose a systemic threat to the
economy. A new SRO could actually help the SEC to undertake

275
Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation:
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2007).
276
Id. at 255.
277
Id. at 261.
278
Id. at 259–60.
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these newly created tasks under the Dodd-Frank Act. SROs are
in fact intended to be a cost-effective solution for problems in
which the SEC has limited expertise.279
There would also be costs associated with developing a
standardized reporting framework. However, the SRO could use
the systemic risk data, which the SEC is already authorized to
collect, to compile the risk database system that is proposed
herein. Essentially, the SEC would be putting this data into the
hands of the actual investors, instead of keeping it to themselves.
Furthermore, the MFA and AIFMA are already incurring private
costs in developing best practices models and other
recommendations for standardized operating functions, valuation
mechanisms, and risk assessments.280 In effect, this solution
corresponds to the increasing demands of private actors within
the industry. As a result, the costs of developing such standards
could be minimal if these standards are considered ideal by the
newly created SRO.
2.

Benefits

The primary benefit of creating this alternative framework is
that it gives sophisticated investors more information to make
better investment choices. It would resolve many of the unique
investor protection issues discussed herein by mandating certain
business practices within the hedge fund industry and creating a
risk database that would allow investors to adequately
investigate and compare a larger range of hedge fund
investments. This would give such investors more reliable data
to ensure that they fully understand the corresponding risks of
investing in hedge funds.
Overall, this new framework would help to preserve the
integrity of our capital markets by creating a more transparent
hedge fund marketplace. Transparency is typically the best
mechanism for exposing deficiencies that could lead to various
market failures. Before our recent financial crises, this benefit
was probably thought to be somewhat vague and arbitrary. Yet,
279
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-623, PRIVATE FUND ADVISERS:
ALTHOUGH A SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATION COULD SUPPLEMENT SEC
OVERSIGHT, IT WOULD PRESENT CHALLENGES AND TRADE-OFFS 20 (2011), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11623.pdf.
280
See Jackson, supra note 275, at 260.
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after our economy has lost trillions of dollars in recovering from
the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, it is
essential that our regulators play a more vital role in
implementing ex ante regulation to enhance transparency, which
would subsequently improve the integrity of our markets.
Furthermore, this reporting framework would help the
regulators to better understand the hedge fund industry. It
would also open the door to more meaningful empirical research
opportunities to better understand the complexities of the
industry.
Several empirical research studies have been
completed, but they are severely limited in scope because there is
no existing reporting framework that tracks all hedge funds.
While many hedge funds do report their returns to various
reporting indexes, such reporting is not mandatory. The most
prominent hedge fund index is the Dow Jones Credit Suisse
Hedge Fund IndexSM—formerly known as the Credit
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index—and it tracks approximately
8,000 funds.281
This number includes offshore funds, and
excludes fund-of-funds.282 In addition, the index only includes
funds that have a minimum of $50 million assets under
management, a minimum one-year track record, and current
audited financial statements.283 Overall, there are about 18,000
hedge funds in existence, but it is difficult to verify this number
since there is no mandatory reporting framework that tracks all
hedge funds.284
F.

Counterarguments to Alternative Approach

1.

Deterrence of Hedge Fund Activity

Some commenters believe that this proposed framework may
deter hedge funds from operating in the United States. However,
this proposed framework seeks to protect the proprietary position
data of hedge funds, which is often the primary hurdle towards
achieving better transparency practices within the industry. In

281

Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indexes: FAQ’s, HEDGEINDEX.COM,
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/en/faq.aspx?cy=USD&indexname=HEDG
(last visited Sept. 16, 2012).
282
Id.
283
Id.
284
PERTRAC FIN. SOLUTIONS, supra note 14.
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fact, many hedge funds are already disclosing comparable
information to investors, who are starting to demand more
information in response to the recent financial crisis. For
example, one study enacted by PricewaterhouseCoopers found
that following the financial crisis, “[Hedge fund] [i]nvestors are
requiring far higher standards of governance and more robust
operations, combined with greater transparency into operational
controls, investment portfolio construction and performance.”285
In addition, the development of this reporting framework will
include the perspectives of industry participants through the
creation of an SRO. As a result, the industry will have a voice in
discussing the extent to which the disclosure of certain
information would cause harm to its investors.
2.

Political Hurdles

Some commenters also believe that the proposed alternative
framework would be too difficult to implement from a political
standpoint, especially since it would directly contradict longstanding notions of investor protection principles. In effect, this
framework would single-handedly dismantle the sophisticated
investor doctrine, which asserts that sophisticated investors are
fully capable of protecting themselves, without government
intervention.
However, the Dodd-Frank Act has already
indirectly limited the effectiveness of this doctrine. Essentially,
by bringing hedge funds under the SEC’s umbrella, Congress has
sent a signal that such investors are no longer capable of
monitoring the markets. The ensuing regulations under the
Dodd-Frank Act will likely further dismantle the sophisticated

285
From Black Box to Open Book: Hedge Fund Trust and Transparency,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (2010), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/
asset-management/assets/pwc-hf-trust-and-transparency.pdf.
This
view
was
reiterated in a report published by Ernst & Young, which stated that, “The global
hedge fund industry . . . is responding readily to investor requests for greater
transparency[.]” Hedge Funds Rebound Amid Calls for Greater Transparency, ERNST
& YOUNG (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Newsroom/News-releases/
Hedge_funds-rebound-amid-calls-for-greater-transparency. See also Stephan Thollot,
Push for Transparency Puts Spotlight on Valuation for Alternative Asset Managers,
(Oct.
2011),
available
at
https://eyaprimo.ey.com/
ERNST & YOUNG
natlmktgaprimoey/Attachments/AMCenter_Valuation_J00370.pdf.
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investor doctrine.
Thus, implementing a framework that
explicitly acknowledges this proposition may not be as difficult to
accomplish given the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.
3.

Cost Limitations

Some commenters may think that this system is too costly to
implement. There is definitely merit to this argument since the
SEC has publicly admitted that its limited resources make it
difficult to effectively monitor registered advisers.286 However,
this may be an indication that the existing regulatory framework
is ineffective, especially given the multiple market failures that
have occurred in recent years. The federal government has
expended trillions of dollars in correcting these failures, in which
hedge funds play a significant role. Perhaps a better use of the
government’s resources would be to creating ex ante regulation
that would prevent comparable market failures. It is clear that
the existing regulation did little to prevent these failures and for
the most part, the Dodd-Frank Act does little to reinvent the
wheel.
CONCLUSION
This Article presents an alternative regulatory framework
for the increased regulation of hedge funds, which focuses on the
unique investor protection issues created by the hedge fund
industry. It would supplement the new regulation provided
under the Dodd-Frank Act, which seems to primarily focus on
preventing systemic risk.
This framework would enhance
investor protection by standardizing certain business practices
within the overall hedge fund industry and creating a risk
database that would allow investors to adequately compare a
larger range of hedge fund investments. Furthermore, this
reporting framework would open the door to more meaningful
empirical research opportunities to better understand the hedge
fund market and give investors more reliable data without
exposing hedge funds’ positions.
In addition, it could potentially decrease the likelihood of
systemic risk since it would create more transparency within the
hedge fund industry. Mary Schapiro, the Chairman of the SEC,
286

See supra note 108.
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stated that systemic risk could be mitigated by “the traditional
oversight, regulation, market transparency and enforcement
provided by primary regulators that helps keep systemic risk
from developing in the first place.”287 While it is arguable that
greed motivated the poor decisions of sophisticated investors, it is
clear that many of these investors did not fully understand the
risks entailed within these complex transactions.
Thus,
removing the assumption that sophisticated investors can fend
for themselves is an essential step towards creating a more
efficient regulatory regime. In effect, by focusing on investor
protection and implementing ex ante regulation,288 our
regulators, as well as actual hedge fund investors, might be in a
better position to stop systemic risk before it actually occurs.

287
Testimony Concerning Regulation of Systemic Risk, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/
2009/ts072309mls.htm.
288
RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 31 (2009) (proposing implementing ex ante regulation as
regulating the financial industry before a catastrophic event occurs).

